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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FAUSTINO GONZALEZ,
                          Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 02-cr-00261-07)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 10, 2007
Before:  RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
and SHAPIRO,* District Judge.
(Filed:  July 31, 2007)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
__________________
       * Honorable Norma L. Shapiro, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.   
2SHAPIRO, District Judge.
Appellant-defendant Faustino Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) appeals a criminal sentence
of 84 months imposed following a plea of guilty to two counts of interstate travel in aid of
racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).  Gonzalez’s counsel, submitting there
are no nonfrivolous issues raised in the appeal, has moved to withdraw from the appeal,
and filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We will
affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.  
I.
In the summer of 2001, the Bureau of Narcotics Investigation, Drug Enforcement
Administration, and Internal Revenue Service jointly investigated reported members or
associates of the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation (the “Latin Kings”) led by Luis
D. Rivera (“Rivera”).  Rivera’s brother, Gonzalez, traveled with Rivera to New York to
purchase heroin in February 2001 and December 2001.  (PSR ¶ 8.)  Gonzalez did not
know the amount purchased, but described it as a “large quantity.”  Id.            
On October 23, 2002, Gonzalez was charged with two counts of “intentionally and
knowingly manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with the intent to manufacture and
distribute heroin,” in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), and aiding and abetting the
commission of an offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2.  Both charged events allegedly
occurred from September 2000 through February 2002.  For much of that time period,
Gonzalez was incarcerated on unrelated state charges; he was incarcerated on February
    1It appears that, at the time of sentencing, Gonzalez was serving two concurrent 5-10
year terms on state charges and had a pending appeal concerning parole revocation for a
24 month period.
    2Gonzalez was also ordered to pay a $1,000 fine.
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26, 2001, and re-paroled to a drug program from August 27, 2001, until November 27,
2001. 
Gonzalez pled guilty to a felony information charging him with two counts of
interstate travel in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3).  At sentencing,
Gonzalez objected to three aspects of the pre-sentence report: miscalculation of the
quantity of heroin; failure to recognize his minimal participation in the offense; and the
failure of the trial court to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  The District
Court granted Gonzalez a two level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, but denied
his other objections.
Gonzalez was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment (consecutive 60-month
terms on Counts One and Two) consecutive to Gonzalez’s undischarged terms of
imprisonment in York County.1  Gonzalez was also sentenced to two three-year terms of
supervised release on Counts One and Two, concurrent to each other.2
Gonzalez, appealing his sentence, argued: his federal custodial sentence should run
concurrent to his undischarged state terms of imprisonment; the District Court erred in
determining his interstate travel in aid of drug trafficking involved a total of
approximately two kilograms of heroin; and he was entitled to a reduction for minimal
4participation.  We held the District Court had discretion to impose a custodial sentence
consecutive to Gonzalez’s undischarged state terms, did not decide the other two issues
raised on appeal, vacated Gonzalez’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing in light of
the subsequent decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).    
At the District Court resentencing hearing, it imposed a sentence of 108 months’
incarceration, one year less than the previous sentence; otherwise, the prior sentence was
reimposed.  Gonzalez appealed again and argued the District Court miscalculated the
drug amounts and improperly denied his request for a downward departure under the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines as a minimal participant.  We vacated his sentence and
remanded for a second resentencing hearing and directed the District Court to address the
scope of the “relevant conduct” for which Gonzalez would be held accountable, the
quantity of heroin involved in Gonzalez’s acts, any other relevant conduct, and whether
Gonzalez was entitled to a mitigating role reduction.  
At the second resentencing, the District Court found the amount of heroin was at
least 80 grams but less than 100 grams; it also agreed to a two-level reduction in the
offense level because Gonzalez was a minor participant in the drug operation.  Gonzalez
was sentenced to 60 months in custody on Count One and 24 months on Count Two
consecutive to Count One but concurrent to Gonzalez’s undischarged terms of
imprisonment in York County (a total of 84 months of incarceration).  The District Court
    3Gonzalez again was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine.
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also imposed three years of supervised release.3  Gonzalez filed a timely appeal and now
argues: his 24-month sentence on Count Two should have been imposed concurrent to the
60-month sentence on Count One; the District Court applied the incorrect offense level
and criminal history category; and he should have received a four-level decrease in
offense level as a “minimal participant.”  Counsel filed an Anders motion to withdraw. 
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
Under Anders, if counsel, after conscientious examination, finds the case wholly
frivolous, he should advise the court and request permission to withdraw.  386 U.S. at
744.  The request to withdraw must be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal; the brief must be provided to the appellant
and time allowed him to respond.  Id.  The court fully examines all the proceedings and
decides whether the case is wholly frivolous.  Id.  If the court finds the case frivolous, it
may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal, or proceed to a decision
on the merits.  Id.  But if the court finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits, it
must afford the indigent appellant assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.  Id.  
Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) reflects the Anders guidelines.  It requires that,
“[w]here, upon review of the district court record, trial counsel is persuaded that the
appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, trial counsel may file a motion to
6withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to [Anders], which shall be served upon the
appellant and the United States.”  Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a).
The court's inquiry when counsel submits an  Anders brief is twofold.  It must first
determine whether counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Rule 109.2(a).  United
States v. Youla, 289 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  The Anders brief must satisfy the court
that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and
explain why the issues are frivolous.  See id.  Counsel need not raise and reject every
possible claim, but, at a minimum, he or she must meet the “conscientious examination”
standard under Anders.  Id. 
The court then determines whether an independent review of the record presents
any issues that are not frivolous.  Id. at 301.  Where the Anders brief initially appears
adequate on its face, the appellate court is guided in reviewing the record by the brief
itself.  Id.  An appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where none of the legal points are
arguable on the merits.  Id. 
Counsel’s Anders motion raises one issue: whether the District Court erred by
imposing consecutive sentences for the two counts of interstate travel in aid of
racketeering.  Counsel summarized the facts and procedural history of the case, identified
the issue, and cited the applicable law.  He explained the issue is frivolous because
Gonzalez, having pled guilty to interstate travel in aid of racketeering, in violation of 21
U.S.C.A. § 1925(a)(3), on two distinct occasions, was subject to sentencing for each
violation.  When multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same
    4Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b), in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences,
a district court must also consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.  The record must
demonstrate the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors. 
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).  A court is not required to
discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the
court took the factors into account in sentencing.  Id.  At the resentencing hearing on June
9, 2006, the District Court heard statements from Gonzalez, from two of his family
members, and argument from counsel about Gonzalez’s post-arrest rehabilitation.  The
Judge noted the offense level and criminal history category, and acknowledged that
Gonzalez had a loving family, before imposing the sentence.  The District Court
adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 
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time, the district court may impose concurrent or consecutive terms, except the terms may
not run consecutively for an attempt and for another offense that was the sole object of
the attempt.  18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).  The Sentencing Guidelines advise, “if the sentence
imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total
punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run
consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to
the total punishment.”  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d).  The statutory maximum of 60 months for
one count of interstate travel in aid of racketeering is less than Gonzalez’s sentencing
guidelines range of 70 to 87 months.  The consecutive sentence imposed by the District
Court, totaling 84 months, is within the guidelines range and is reasonable because
Gonzalez committed interstate travel in aid of racketeering on two separate occasions. 
The Court agrees this issue is frivolous.4   
In response to the Anders motion, Gonzalez filed a brief raising two additional
issues.  Gonzalez argues the District Court applied the incorrect offense level and
8criminal history category.  Under U.S.S.G § 2E1.2, the base offense level for an 18
U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) offense is the greater of six or the offense level applicable to the
underlying unlawful activity with respect to which the travel was undertaken.  The
offense level under U.S.S.G § 2D1.1 for drug offenses involving at least 80 grams but
less than 100 grams of heroin is 24.  The District Court subtracted two levels for minor
participation and two levels for acceptance of responsibility, and correctly concluded
Gonzalez’s offense level was 20.  Sent. Hr’g Tr. 3, 10, June 9, 2006.
    The pre-sentence report, citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, states Gonzalez has a subtotal of
nine criminal history points based on three York County Court convictions for delivery of
heroin and cocaine.  Two points were added under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) because Gonzalez
committed the instant offense while on parole.  Another point was added under U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.1(e) because Gonzalez committed the instant offense less than two years after his
release from imprisonment in York County.  Gonzalez has a total of 12 criminal history
points; that would ordinarily result in a criminal history category of V, but as a career
offender, his criminal history category is automatically increased to VI.  Gonzalez’s
argument that his offense level and criminal history category were miscalculated is
frivolous.
Gonzalez also argues he should have received a four-level decrease in offense
level because he was a minimal participant.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 provides a four-level
decrease in the offense level of a “minimal participant” in any criminal activity and a two-
level decrease in the offense level of a “minor participant.”  A “minimal participant” is
9one who plays a minimal role in concerted activity and is “plainly among the least
culpable of those involved.”  U.S.S.G. Manual § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 4 (2006).  This adjustment
is to be applied infrequently.  Id.  A “minor participant” is one who is less culpable than
most other participants, but whose role cannot be described as minimal.  U.S.S.G. Manual
§ 3B1.2 cmt. n. 5 (2006). 
In applying § 3B1.2, a district court must weigh the totality of the particular
circumstances in a defendant’s case, and is not required to grant an adjustment based
solely upon the defendant’s assertions.  U.S.S.G. Manual § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 3(C) (2006). 
The district court’s inquiry involves weighing factors such as the defendant’s relationship
to other participants, his knowledge of others’ activities, the importance of his actions to
the success of the venture, his economic interest in the scheme and his physical
participation.  United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 735 (3d Cir. 1994).  District courts
exercise broad discretion in applying § 3B1.2 and their rulings are left largely undisturbed
on appeal.  See United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 238-39 (3d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 1997) (district court’s factual findings
regarding classification as minimal participant are sustained unless clearly erroneous). 
Gonzalez accompanied his brother to New York to purchase heroin.  When this Court
remanded for resentencing on April 26, 2006, we noted, “Gonzalez may not warrant any
mitigating role adjustment as the charge of interstate travel in aid of racketeering as a
result of a plea bargain is ‘an offense significantly less serious than warranted by his
actual criminal conduct,’ U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, Application Note 3(B), since he would
    5We also note that Gonzalez makes allegations in support of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in the “Statement of facts” section of his brief only.  If an appellant fails to
set forth a particular issue on appeal and present an argument in support of that issue in
the opening brief, then the appellant normally has abandoned and waived that issue on
appeal and we do not address it.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Gonzalez has not set forth any arguments or citations relevant to an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim in his brief.  No ineffective assistance of counsel claim has been
preserved, and we decline to address any such claim.  
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already have received, in essence, a mitigating role reduction by virtue of the conviction
on a lesser charge.”  United States v. Gonzalez, 178 Fed. Appx. 130, 135 n. 6 (3d Cir.
2006).  Nevertheless, finding Gonzalez a minor participant, the District Court granted a
two-level reduction in offense level.  The decision not to grant a four-level reduction was
clearly within its discretion.  Gonzalez’s argument is frivolous.5 
Where the court finds adequate merit to the appeal, the court will discharge current
counsel, appoint substitute counsel, and restore the case to the calendar.  Third Circuit
L.A.R. 109.2(a); see Youla, 241 F.3d at 302.  Where an appeal is without merit, the court
will grant counsel’s Anders motion and dispose of the appeal without appointing new
counsel.  Id.  We discern no merit to Gonzalez’s appeal. 
III.
We will AFFIRM the June 9, 2006, sentence imposed by the District Court and
GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
